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Interactivity - Hypertextuality - Transversality
A media-philosophical analysis of the Internet1
Abstract
My considerations are organized into three parts. In the first part I expand upon
the influence of the Internet on our experience of space and time as well as our
concept of personal identity. This takes place, on the one hand, in the example
of text-based Internet services (IRC, MUDs, MOOs), and through the World
Wide Web’s (WWW) graphical user-interface on the other. Interactivity, the
constitution characteristic for the Internet, stands at the centre of this. In the
second part I will show how the World Wide Web in particular sets in motion
those semiotic demarcations customary until now. To this end I recapitulate,
first of all, the way in which image, language and writing have been set in rela-
tion to one another in the philosophical tradition. The multimedia hypertext-
uality which characterizes the World Wide Web is then revealed against this
background. In the third, and final, part I interpret the World Wide Web’s hy-
pertextual structure as a mediative form of realization of a contemporary type
of reason. This takes place on the basis of the philosophical concept of tranver-
sality developed by the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch.
Introduction
In times of transition metaphors boom. And it is little wonder. For the
metaphor, that is, the transfer from one semantic realm to another, is the
linguistic instrument which allows us to grasp a transition as transition
in words. The metaphor is an expression which in itself changes, that is,
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represents historical transition as a process of semantic transmission. In
times of transition, in which concepts start to move along with the phe-
nomena, hardly any linguistic instruments are more exact and appropri-
ate than metaphors. But for metaphors, as for all words which we use,
it is important that we understand the use we are making of them. If this
occurs then metaphors can be applied discerningly to cast scientific
light on complex phenomena. A metaphor is not per se imprecise or
aesthetical; a concept not per se precise and scientific. In both cases the
question of precision and scientific nature is a question of use. What I
would like to attempt in the following is to mobilise metaphorically
some expressions (such as ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘identity’, ‘image’, ‘lan-
guage’ or ‘writing’) which we do not usually use as metaphors, so that
they become suitable for the purposes of describing our dealings with
the Internet.
Media shape our image of reality. This applies for media in the broad,
in the narrow, and in the narrowest sense. By media in the broad sense
I understand space and time as forms of intuition. They function as the
constitutive media of our perception and cognition by making objects
synthesizeable as identifiable entities. This insight lies at the root of the
”Copernican revolution” with which Kant laid the basis of modern phi-
losophy. Post-Kantian philosophy, from Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger,
Dewey, Cassirer and the late Wittgenstein, through to Derrida, Good-
man, Gadamer and Rorty has demonstrated that the strength of this
foundation lies not - as Kant thought - in its transcendental signature,
but far more in its flexibility, openness and changeability. Our spatio-
temporal ”ways of worldmaking” (Goodman, 1978) are not a rigid, uni-
form and ahistorical apparatus. The media of human construction of
reality are shaped far more by pictorial, linguistic and textual sign sys-
tems which are historically contingent and culturally divergent.
Image, language and writing are what is meant when I talk of media
in the narrow sense. They have been at the centre of many philoso-
phical discussions in the twentieth century concerned mostly with iden-
tifying one or more of these media as being a binding base structure for
human understanding of reality altogether, or - at the very least - as the
foundation of the world-picture characteristic of Western culture. The
spectrum reaches from analytic philosophy’s ”linguistic turn” (Rorty,
1967) and the diverse misunderstandings triggered by Derrida’s early
concept of a philosophical ”grammatology” (Derrida, 1976) in the
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realm of post-modern thinking, through to contemporary proclamations
of a ”pictorial turn” (Mitchell, 1994).
Today it is becoming impossible to ignore the fact that neither media
in the broad sense nor media in the narrow sense represent fixed,
unchanging structures which offer a firm footing for philosophical
theory. The way we deal with them is also dependent on institutional
and technological developments which take place in the realm of media
in the narrowest sense, that is, of technical media of transmission.
This already holds for the influence which printed media, radio, and
above all television have attained over our understanding of space and
time as well as over our use of images, sounds and letters (Sandbothe/
Zimmerli, 1994). Given the influence that interactive data networks
such as the Internet have on our perception and on our semiotic prac-
tice, the intertwined relationships existing between media in the broad,
narrow and narrowest sense are becoming obvious. Space, time and
identity are being inflected anew in the Internet. The traditional de-
marcation between image, language and writing is beginning to move.
With interactive data-networks the digital revolution is becoming the
driving force of a comprehensive transformation, one redefining the
practices we use to handle signs and, hence, the bedrock of our under-
standing of reality. 
In the following I shall look into this transformation process in three
steps. In the first part I shall expand upon the influence of the Internet
on our experience of space and time as well as our concept of personal
identity. In the second part I will show how the World Wide Web in
particular sets in motion the semiotic demarcations of image, language
and writing. In the third, and final, part I interpret the World Wide
Web’s hypertextual structure as a mediative form of realization of a
contemporary type of reason. 
1. Interactivity
The Net opens up a new world to us. And this it does in a way differing
from, say, a trip by car or aeroplane. When we fly from Berlin to San
Francisco we also arrive in another world in which, partially, other laws
dominate. But the basic coordinates of our understanding of reality -
space, time, identity - remain unchanged. It is different when we leave
‘real’ life and proceed into the Net. The world becomes ‘virtual’. The
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constitution of reality becomes a different one. ‘Virtual reality’ steps in,
taking the place of ‘real life’. The terms ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ are reflexi-
ve terms similar to the opposition of natural and artificial (Welsch,
1997, p. 172f). Things only ever appear ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ from a parti-
cular perspective. If one considers the oberver’s relativity then it is no
surprise that the on-line world already seems more real to many profes-
sional Net-surfers than the ‘real’ world outside of the Net. I do not asso-
ciate normative implications of any kind with the real-virtual opposi-
tion. I use this only to differentiate varying forms of construction of re-
ality from one another on the descriptive level.
1.1. Identity in the Internet
How does the virtual reality of cyberspace affect our concept of identi-
ty? To begin with, it seems, not at all. Since in the Net too I am usually
out and about with my usual identity as the academic, Mike Sandbothe.
I procure myself bibliographical information from the Library of Con-
gress in Washington, make contributions to philosophical mailing lists
to which I have subscribed, or confer with colleagues around the world
via e-mail. At the same time, however, I also have the opportunity in the
Net to set off to the anonymous channels of IRC or the fantasy environ-
ment of a MUD or MOO.
IRC is the abbreviation for Internet Relay Chat, which is a complex
communications landscape consisting of a multitude of different con-
versation fora, or channels. People meet here on-line from all over the
world, using nicknames they have chosen themselves, in order to con-
verse with one another in the written form, but nonetheless synchro-
nously, and to exchange up to the minute information on diverse
themes. The subject areas range from day-to-day net gossip and virtual
flirting, technical questions concerning hardware and software, through
to more or less academic conversations on literature, politics, philoso-
phy, physics, medicine and other objects (Rheingold, 1994, p. 176-
196). IRC was developed in 1988 at the University of Oulu (Finland) by
Jarkko Oikarinen (Rheingold, 1994, p. 179).
MUD is the abbreviation for Multi User Dungeon, which is a virtual
gaming ‘haunt’. A number of different participants log in simultane-
ously in a fictional text-based game landscape in order to collect so-cal-
led ‘experience points’ in combat with other players and programmed
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robots, and to advance in the respective game’s hierarchy to being a
‘wizard’ or ‘god’. Wizards and gods have the power to alter the game
landscape and to program the problems which the other participants
have to solve (Rheingold, 1994, p. 145-175; Turkle, 1995, p. 180-186).
The first MUD was created in 1979 by Richard Bartle and Roy Trub-
shaw at the University of Essex (Rheingold, 1994, p. 151).
MOO stands for Multi User Dungeon Object Oriented, which - in
contrast to the strictly hierarchically organized and sometimes quite
violent adventure MUDs - are games in which cooperation, solidarity,
education and science are central. Every participant receives program-
ming rights from the start, i.e. he or she can create rooms and objects
and independently contribute to the shaping of the game landscape. It
was James Aspnes, a graduate student at the Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity in Pittsburgh, who, in 1989, came up with the idea of conceiving
such democratic MUDs and thus foregrounding the development of
virtual communities. In the USA MOOs have been being used for
several years as interactive learning environments in which parents and
children, pupils and teachers can together playfully gather experience
with the new medium Internet (Bruckman, 1997a/b).
In IRC, in the MUDs and MOOs I can present myself with an inven-
ted identity X or Y according to the context. Of course, I could also do
this “in real life” - or, to use the Internet-jargon abbreviation, IRL - in
some bar or other. But limits are imposed on me by my appearance, my
gender, my physical and social identity. This is not the case in the Net.
In the Net, the day-to-day concept of physical and embodied identity is
rendered void. What is interesting in this is that there are fluid transi-
tions between the normal Net-world of daily academic life and invented
MUD, MOO and IRC identities. As such the IRC command ‘whois’,
for example, makes it possible to relate the different nicknames of a
user, who might be sojourning in several channels simultaneously, to
his or her e-mail address, host and user IDs. But it should be borne in
mind here that most Net freaks use several e-mail addresses and user or
host IDs. The supposedly ‘real’ user and host identities can also be de
facto virtual, that is, different from the user’s IRL identity and IRL
location.
Many MUDs and MOOs are based on the permanent interplay be-
tween real and virtual identities. Thus in the MIT MediaMOO close en-
tanglements and frequent transitions between players’ academic and
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fictional identities are the norm. The MediaMOO is a text-based com-
munications and research environment for media researchers. It was set
up at the end of 1992 by Amy Bruckman, a former doctoral student at
the MIT MediaLab teaching now at the Georgia Institute of Technolo-
gy, and has been accessible to the Internet public since the start of 1993.
In December 1994 MediaMOO already had 1100 active members from
29 countries (Bruckman/Resnik, 1995). In 1996 a didactically con-
ceived and educationally supervised virtual school-landscape - the
MOOSE Crossing - was opened on the MIT computers for 800-1000
children aged from 10 to 12 years. This project is also being led by Amy
Bruckman (Bruckman, 1997a/b). On the title page of her publications
the young Internet researcher provides, alongside her IRL name, the e-
mail addresses of the fictional identities by which she is known in dif-
ferent places on the Net where she has carried out investigations and
interviews for her research. In so doing she makes it clear how closely
intertwined the different identities are with one another and how just
this mesh of identities can be deployed for academic research (Bruck-
man, 1992). But it is not just the traditional concept of personal identi-
ty, but the everyday experience of space and time underlying this con-
cept which is transformed by the virtual Net-world. 
1.2. Space and time in the Internet
As a cursor-identity I move quite independently of the real world and its
geographical distances. I move in the Net’s digital space and beam
myself from continent to continent without any role being played by
real separation (Mitchell, 1995). As such, even when I am out and about
in the Net with my normal academic’s identity, I still find myself in vir-
tual mode. In cyberspace everything is present here and now. This leads
to change in our experience of time (Sandbothe, 2000a). On IRC, in the
MUDs and MOOs there is no night. It is always day. Somewhere in the
world people are always awake to populate the Net’s countless meeting
places. The screen only knows how to glimmer. The virtual world is in-
dependent of sunlight. There is no unitary, somehow natural time which
partners in communication could presuppose as self-evident. Rather
they must onerously inform one another about their respective local
times and adjust for the differences if they want to meet on the Net. The
horizons of time are in constant motion.
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Whereas television prescribes its recipients a fixed linear time track,
the timing, that is the temporal arrangement of on-line meetings in
MUDs and MOOs takes place through individual agreements between
users. Here too, of course, certain regularities in practice quickly estab-
lish themselves. But these regularities are appointments you make
yourself, which can be made the object of dealings and discussion with-
in the Internet’s virtual communities. In place of a prescribed presence,
conveyed to passive recipients by the medium of television, come in the
Internet’s communication services socially constructed times of presen-
ce, within which users constitute their identities on the bedrock of writ-
ing-based interaction in a context of shared plans for the future.
Furthermore, in the virtual surroundings of text-based communica-
tions worlds users themselves have the chance to invent and to program
the narrative description of the virtual space in which they, along with
other participants, move. Space no longer seems to be a given entity,
within which you simply move around passively and on which you can
have no influence whatsoever. Rather it becomes a consciously con-
structed and aesthetically staged artefact. Along with the rooms around
which on-line agents move, the times in which respective narratives are
played out are also staged by the participants themselves. The peculiar
virtual spatiality of MUDs and MOOs corresponds with their specific
temporality. 
Unlike with television or computer games designed for stand alone
machines, the inhabitants of the Internet’s communicative, text-based
worlds of MUD and MOO are not forced into prescribed simulations of
space and time, but rather experience space and time as creatively
shapeable constructions of their narrative and cooperative imagination.
In MUDs and MOOs a theatricalization of space and time takes place.
Participants who have and make use of programming rights become the
architects and dramaturgists of a virtual theatre, on whose electronic
stage the spatio-temporal base structure of our perceptions itself be-
comes the object to be staged. 
1.3. Interactivity in the mode of appresence 
Until now I have gone into changes relevant not primarily to the World
Wide Web, but to text-based Internet services such as IRC, MUDs and
MOOs. I shall now concentrate on the specific features of the World
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Wide Web. To do this it is helpful to compare the media structure of the
Internet with those media which have decisively forged our daily life
until now: with television and the telephone. Whereas television can
only be described as a one-way street in terms of its communicative
structure - information flows unidirectionally, exclusively from the bro-
adcasting institution with its programme mandate to the passive TV
consumer - the Internet is an interactive and multidirectional medium.
Every receiver is a potential transmitter. Yet this already holds for tra-
ditional text-based services like IRC, MUDs and MOOs. The World
Wide Web’s specificity consists in that these systems’ simple interactiv-
ity is decisively enhanced and fashioned by the World Wide Web’s
graphical interface. 
Everyone who has a PC, an Internet connection, the corresponding
software, and perhaps in addition access to a (video) camera and a scan-
ner, can design their own multimedia Web pages in the World Wide
Web, can devise and make available their own programme. Of course it
is possible to create pages for each of the varying real and virtual roles
which you play within and without the Net (Turkle, 1995, p. 258f).
These can be intertwined with one another through hyperlinks. In the
same way networked links can be made with the Web pages of cyber-
naut friends and with every other data provider to be found on the Net.
The flexible transition from the position of recipient to transmitter
and the possibility of individual programme design are familiar to us
from the structure of ordinary conversational situations. The telephone,
which reproduces these situations over spatial distances, is already an
interactive technology in this sense. In telephone communication we
choose our partner in communication ourselves and, by contributing to
the conversation, assume influence over the ‘programme’ in a figura-
tive sense. But, with the exception of telephone conferencing, the tele-
phone’s bidirectional communicative structure is limited in relation to
the Internet’s multidirectionality. Furthermore - if you neglect answer-
ing machines - the auditive telephone medium, bounded to the human
voice, permits no self-presentation which is independent of one’s own
presence. It is exactly this which becomes possible through the World
Wide Web.
My Web page is a miniature double of my self, in some cases even
the creative invention of a new self, of a new identity, which I had pre-
viously hidden from myself and others, and which now mediatively
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interacts with other people in my absence. The particularity in the
World Wide Web’s media structure lies not least in this new dimension
against telephone and television, that of a so to speak ‘appresent’ inter-
activity independent of my real presence. Through this our identity is
pluralized in its rudiments. The images we have of ourselves and which
others have of us gain a life of their own independent of our presence.
These plural identities stand in intertwined relations with other real and
virtual Net identities which we act under in different contexts on the
Net. Our Net personality is composed of a mesh of varying roles, iden-
tities and functions, which we can strictly isolate from one another, or
consciously link with one another. The technical possibility of these
entanglements results from the second specific feature of the World
Wide Web: from hypertextuality.
2. Hypertextuality
Whereas the classical Internet services, from e-mail and Talk, Net
News and mailing lists, through to IRC, MUDs and MOOs are oriented
towards the model of linear textuality, the qualitative transition to non-
linear hypertextuality occurs in the World Wide Web. The word ‘hyper-
text’ was coined by Ted Nelson in the sixties. In his “Xanadu Hypertext
System” he was one of the first to attempt the technical implementation
of the hypertext concept (Nelson, 1981). But Douglas C. Engelbart was
the first to successfully achieve this goal with his oN Line System
(NLS) in 1968. The idea of hypertextuality in a broad sense can be
traced back to Vannevar Bush. This early pioneer of associative infor-
mation retrieval had already projected a new, technically advanced
architecture of scientific thought and research in his article “As We
May Think” which appeared in Atlantic Monthly in July 1945. The
“Memex system” he designed was conceived as a mechanical apparatus
which, through “associative indexing”, should make it possible that
“any item may be caused at will to select immediately and automatical-
ly another” (Bush, 1945, 34). 
Hypertext documents, which constitute the core of the World Wide
Web can be structured by means of the simple HTML language (Hyper-
Text Markup Language) so that the text represents not a fixed linear
sequence, but functions as a network to be actively composed. Every
building block of text (node) contains a multitude of keywords, picto-
grams and pictures which can be clicked on with a mouse: these are the
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so-called “links”. These easily set up and flexibly variable points of
intersection bind the nodes into a rhizomatic network. 
Hypertext technology has profound effects on the writing and read-
ing of texts (Landow, 1992). In hypertextual conditions writing and
reading become pictorial operations. The writer develops a netlike
framework, a rhizomatic image of her thoughts. This image is multi-
form and complex. It consists in a plurality of varying paths and refer-
ences which the reader forms into new thought images resulting from
interplay between the text’s open structure and the reader’s interests
and perspectives. Equally, in the hypertext medium the writer is no
longer in a position of omniscience. Whereas the traditional author is
responsible alone for sketching out the closed system of the book or
essay he writes, hypertextual writing and thinking can take place in
immediate interaction with other people’s writing and thinking. Since
in principle every file available in the Internet can be integrated into
one’s own writing the opportunities for interaction are endless. The
reference system is limitless. You could say that the World Wide Web
as a whole is a single giant hypertext in a state of permanent change, in
constant motion. 
Through the World Wide Web’s hypertextual data mesh it becomes
possible to mirror directly the dynamics of knowledge transformation
which characterize modern science. The medium of books and the asso-
ciated publishing institutions have long been unable to come to terms
with the exponentially climbing dynamics of knowledge. The time
elapsing between the writing of a text and its publication by the publis-
hers amounts to several months or even years. This gap in time is over-
come by immediate publication in the Net. It is even possible to work
on a book or an essay in the Net itself. Even the creation of the text then
takes place in a public mode, i.e. in close cooperation with other Net
users who contribute with their comments to the work in progress.
The World Wide Web doesn’t make hypertextuality obligatory. The
book’s linear structures can be depicted straightforwardly in the World
Wide Web. What is more, most texts currently found in the Net are not
hypertexts, but completely normal essays and books which have been
converted into HTML code and revised a little for the Net. At the mo-
ment the World Wide Web serves predominantly to make books and es-
says more accessible more rapidly. So, for a philosopher who is famili-
ar with the Internet, it is no longer a problem to get hold of works by
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John Locke, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche or Ludwig Wittgen-
stein on screen or to view the papers published in the Net from confe-
rences which he considers important.
In contrast to this the authentic hypertext-style writing and thinking
measuring up to the features of the new medium still represents a
demanding future task. Schools and universities, teachers, academics
and authors must first of all be prepared for this (Sandbothe, 1996b,
1999, 2000b). For this purpose it is to be expected that classical texts of
the tradition be made available as genuine hypertexts, i.e. as thought
networks bound together by links (cf. Delany/Landow, 1991, p. 185ff).
This is not as revolutionary and extraordinary as it seems at first glance.
Ancient texts, which we today naturally read in book form already have
a similar media transition behind them. They were originally written on
papyrus rolls, without punctuation, page numbers and contents pages,
and were first implemented in book form afterwards (Reynolds/Wilson,
1978; Bolter, 1991, esp. Chapter 6).
The pragmatic restriction, thematic and goal-directed structuring of
textual and pictorial elements of the World Wide Web is achieved
through user activity. The user’s creativity constitutes the referential
framework which provides answers to questions which had been posed
before Web browsing began. Through the application of Net search
robots, i.e. automatic index programs like Excite, Altavista, InfoSeek,
Lycos, Hotbot or Northern Lights, which is quickly learned, as well as
the use of archiving and structuring tools such as Bookmarks and Hotli-
sts the Net newbie, first threatened with being ‘lost in cyberspace’, in
time becomes a sovereign Net navigator.
The Net navigator, or cybernaut, has learned to find her way around
in the rhizomatic flood of hypertext links. She knows that there is no
original text, no ‘authentic’ document to which all other documents are
to be related. She has figured out that on the Net it is, above all, a mat-
ter of forming little machines, creative text formations and meaningful
images of thought out of the manifold and dispersed textual nodes.
These machines, formations and images, which didn’t exist previously
in this manner and will not continue to exist in the future, constitute a
new ontology of hypertextual signs, one which transforms our basic se-
miotic concepts. In order to work out what these semiotic changes are,
it is helpful to remind ourselves first of all of the classical distinctions
which have determined our dealings with signs until now.
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2.1. The classical triad: image, language, writing
Traditionally in philosophy language and writing, as abstract and arbi-
trary sign systems, have been contrasted with images, as a concrete and
natural medium for representation (Rollin, 1976). In this images are
afforded a peculiarly ambivalent status. On the one hand, in the tradi-
tion reaching from Plato to Hegel, they appear as “an imitation of
looks” (Platon, 1968, p. 281 [598b]), that is as intensified appearance.
The media of language and writing, thought to be more resistant to
mere appearance, are contrasted with the apparent image. On the other
hand the image functions in the mainstream of Western tradition, in
which cognition is thought of as representation and truth as adequaetio,
as a positive exemplar. This was shown critically by Heidegger (Hei-
degger, 1977). Language has been interpreted ever since Aristotle as a
tool for the arbritrary designation of mental images (ideas) representing
reality which “are the same for all” (Aristotle, 1994, p. 43 [16a]). Cor-
respondingly, writing came to be degraded as a tertiary supplement. It
served, according to this tradition, to materialize the phonological signs
of spoken language and to make them storable. The ideal to which lan-
guage and writing are therewith subjected in equal measure is the pro-
cedure of adequate, neutral representation derived from the model of
images. Where language and writing are unable to fulfil this ideal they
drift into a position exposed to the suspicion of deception, a position
occupied by the image in book X of Plato’s Politeia. Jacques Derrida in
Of Grammatology unveils and attempts to deconstruct this constella-
tion.
In recent debates prompted by Derrida, Goodman, Rorty and others,
images are no longer apprehended as being demarcated from signs, but
as sign systems in themselves, to be analysed according to the model of
language and writing. Frequently, however, certain traditional presup-
positions are adhered to. So, for example, it is usually assumed that the
difference between linguistic, textual and pictorial signs is a difference
founded in the semantic and/or syntactical structure of the respective
system of signs. A position of this type is advocated, taking up Good-
man’s argument, by Oliver R. Scholz (Scholz, 1991, p. 82-110). These
assumptions contrast with the thesis, going back to the late Wittgen-
stein, that a sign is first defined through its usage as a image, as a sound
or as a letter (Wittgenstein, 1953). It is insisted by various authors, how-
ever, that even in conditions of a usage-theory of signs there be a unita-
92
ry way of applying something as image, as language or as writing. At
the base of this view is the idea that certain features of the usage can be
named which distinguish ‘image games’, ‘language games’ or ‘writing
games’ as being image games, language games or writing games.
These general features are to permit the internally unitary definition of
the varying sign games and the clear division of the different sorts of
sign from one another through a usage theory of signs (Novitz, 1977;
Kjorup, 1978).
One must object to this that a consistent execution of a pragmatic
usage theory of signs would indicate that we have to deal with complex
bundles of image, language and writing games which too will exhibit
no unitary feature common to all elements of the respective set. The
metaphor of “family resemblances” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 32 [§67])
was introduced by Wittgenstein to describe complex entangled relation-
ships of this type. In addition to the internal entanglement of image, lan-
guage and writing comes the external entanglement which determines
the relation of the three sorts of sign to one another. Just as a general
essential feature cannot be identified to define image as image, langua-
ge as language, and writing as writing, no firm dividing lines can be fix-
ed between the different types of sign. Pictures, sounds and letters are
always intertwined or demarcated relative to and dependent on media in
the narrowest sense, which set out the framework of their use. The pre-
vious media system, in which audiovisual and print media were clearly
divided from one another suggested strict demarcation between the
sorts of sign. The World Wide Web’s multimedia mesh of signs does
away with this separation and redefines their relations (Sandbothe,
1996a).
2.2. Digital Entanglements
Before I begin talking about the mesh of image, language and writing
which characterizes the World Wide Web, I would like first to come
back to the text-based Chat programs (IRC, MUDs, MOOs). Chat pro-
grams developed independently of the World Wide Web but are increas-
ing being integrated into the Web. In Chat programs writing functions
as a medium of direct synchronous communication between conversa-
tion partners who are physically separated and who, as a rule, have nev-
er seen each other. The anonymity specific to the textual medium of the
book is connected in “Chat” with the synchronous interactivity and
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immediate presence of the conversational partner characteristic of
spoken language in face to face communication. In Chat’s “Computer
Mediated Communication” features which previously served as diffe-
rence criteria for the distinction between language and writing are be-
coming entangled. Elisabeth M. Reid examined in detail how the “sharp
distinction between the spoken and written word” (Reid, 1992, p. 7)
becomes blurred in Computer Mediated Communication. The tradition-
al distinction of spoken language as a medium of presence is undermin-
ed by the ‘appresent presence’ of the participants in the written conver-
sation of on-line Chat. It is this performative writing of a conversation
in which language is interactively written instead of spoken, that I call
the tendency toward scriptualization of language.
Corresponding to this, as a parallel phenomenon, is a tendency to-
ward the verbalization of writing. The medium of writing is used in the
conditions of book printing as a distributive technology which excludes
immediate interaction between sender and receiver. In contrast, the In-
ternet opens up possibilities for usage through which writing can be de-
ployed as a medium permiting constant switches in position between
sender and receiver in a flexible manner, similar to that of spoken con-
versation. It is this language-like, that is reciprocal, usage form of an
interactively used writing in conversational mode which I call the ten-
dency toward verbalization of writing.
The parallel nature of the two transformation tendencies toward
scriptualization of language and verbalization of writing indicates that
neither of the two referents - neither spoken language nor writing –
remains unaltered. In on-line Chat language functions as writing, that
is, the spoken word realizes itself in writing as a sign of a sign. And at
the same time writing functions in on-line Chat as an interactively
modelable and contextually situated writing of language, that is, the
written word is no longer misinterpreted as the sign of an authentic sign
- with the latter itself being no longer sign-like. Instead it is understood
as being the sign of a sign of a sign and so on, i.e. as an unending semi-
otic process with a pragmatically determined relative end. Thus in the
medium of Internet a far-reaching, internal development in philosophy
becomes explicit and manifest, namely that which Josef Simon, fol-
lowing on from Derrida, systematically developed in his Philosophy of
the Sign (Simon, 1995) and situated historically within the framework
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of a “process of inversion” (Simon, 1995, p. 43) of the semiotic think-
ing of occidental philosophy.
The consequences for semiotics which result from the cultural prac-
tices arising in the World Wide Web as a whole are more complex than
the effects just described in the realm of Chat programs. On the one
hand, in that the World Wide Web incorporates text-based Chat, it picks
up the usage of writing in analogy to spoken language these services
make possible. On the other hand, however, in that the World Wide Web
is characterized by hypertext documents, writing is reorganized in a
new way pictorially. Alongside the scriptualization of language and the
verbalization of writing taking place in communications services, there
are in addition two transformational tendencies which are specifically
characteristic for the hypertextual World Wide Web: 
2.3. The Pictorialization of Writing and the Scriptualization
of the Image
I will begin with the first of the two named tendencies: the pictorializa-
tion of writing. It is expressed in both the graphic handling of phonetic
writing and in the rehabilitation of non-phonetic writing. Both aspects
of the pictorialization of writing were anticipated by Jay David Bolter
in his 1991 book Writing Space. The Computer, Hypertext, and the
History of Writing. Attention is drawn to the first aspect - the pictorial
use of phonetic writing - by Bolter when he points out that the use of
automatic structuring programs within the framework of word proces-
sing has the effect of making ”text itself graphic by representing its
structure graphically to the writer and the reader” (Bolter, 1991, p. 26).
The World Wide Web’s networked hypertextual system radicalizes this
tendency towards the pictorialization of writing, one already funda-
mentally inset within electronic writing. 
In hypertextual conditions writing and reading become pictorial ope-
rations. The writer creates a net-like structure on the screen, a rhizo-
matic image of his thoughts. This image is many-sided, associative and
complex. It consists of a plurality of different paths and references
which the reader forms into individually varying textual images, result-
ing from the interplay between the text’s open structure and the in-
terests and perspectives of the reader. Hermeneutic operations and
interpretory processes, which in reading a printed text take place in the
95
reader’s mind alone, become visible in hypertextual conditions as read-
ing tracks which in navigated reading contribute to the constitution of
the text on a software level. The entire hypertextual mesh of icons, digi-
tal images, audio and video sequences, as well as linear and non-linear
texts can, against this background, be metaphorically described as an
image-like structure, i.e. as a textual image or a text image. The situa-
tion of the text in space, the tactile distinction of individual complexes
of signs as clickable links, the variably formable structure of the text’s
background, or the opportunities provided by Java to set letters in mo-
tion and embed them in graphic scenes - these are all aspects of what, in
summary, I call the pictorialization of phonetic writing.
The second aspect of the pictorialization of writing - the rehabilita-
tion of nonphonetic writing - had also been identified by Bolter in his
1991 book as a fundamental feature of electronic writing space. Using
the example of the Apple Macintosh Desktop he makes clear that icons
function as ”symbolic elements in a true picture writing” (Bolter, 1991,
p. 51). And he continues: ”Electronic icons realize what magic signs in
the past could only suggest, for electronic icons are functioning repre-
sentations in computer writing” (Bolter, 1991, p. 529). The World Wide
Web also radicalizes this aspect of electronic writing. In the Web text
and image signs become programmable as icons, that is, as signifiers,
which on the pragmatic level with the click of a mouse produce no
longer a merely symbolic, but a real link to what they signify. So in a
philosophical hypertext, for example, a click of the mouse on a se-
quence of words “Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morals’” programmed as
a link leads me directly to Nietzsche’s text; or an image of Friedrich
Nietzsche programmed as a link takes me directly to a Web page with
information about the philosopher’s biography.
Bolter himself, in his essay The Internet in the History of Writing
Technologies (Bolter, 1997), made use in his semiotic analysis of the
World Wide Web of the possible extensions, which follow from his
1991 book. In doing this, however, he arrives at a different assessment
on some points. On the one hand he elicits with great clarity the way in
which hypertext in the World Wide Web ”is first produced in a process
of rearrangement between the reader and the (absent) author(s) who
built the corresponding links into the text” (Bolter, 1997, p. 43). On the
other hand he emphasises that for the relationship between image and
writing: ”All the same, the distinction between word and image does
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not break down completely in electronic writing. Or, better, the distin-
ction collapses - only to confirm itself once again anew” (Bolter, 1997,
p. 54).
Bolter is surely right when he emphasises that in the World Wide
Web the difference between word and image doesn’t break down com-
pletely. Of course the accustomed difference between image and writ-
ing is retained on the surface of our perception of signs. In the World
Wide Web too we are able to discern by means of our well-established
semantic frame whether we are dealing with graphic or text signs. What
is changing, however, is the whole spectrum of possible use which we
can make of image and writing in hypertext. Alongside linear se-
quences of writing non-linear meshes of text are found, alongside sim-
ple, non-clickable images there are image-intersections functioning as
‘source anchors’, which refer with a link beyond themselves to other
signs. The semiotic difference between image and writing neither
breaks down completely, nor does it remain stiff and unaltered: rather it
constitutes itself anew in the context of a medium-specifically altered
usage, i.e. it formulates the semantic distinction it makes in a modified
manner and accentuates aspects different from those emphasised until
now.
On the level of use our dealings with writing in hypertextual condi-
tions are beginning to adopt qualitites and aspects which we traditio-
nally assigned to images.  The floating reading of text signs is being
modified by an image-like dramatization of the arrangement of signs
which is characteristic of the World Wide Web. In digital writing hyper-
textual links function as intersections which cut across an individual
text’s linear flow of signs and present themselves as nodes of thought,
giving the reader the opportunity whilst reading to codesign actively the
individual constellation of the text, i.e. the sequence of textual elements
and the direct link to inter-, para-, meta- and hypotexts. In this open,
non-linear mode of floating reception of signs forms of perception enter
in which are known to us from the reception of images. In the percep-
tion of a picture - unlike the reading of a book - we are not tempted from
the start to follow a linearly sequenced pattern of thought-construction.
The pictorial elements comprising an image are susceptible instead to
various patterns of non-linear reception and hence different forms of
reading and of construction of the image as a meaningful unity.
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New modes of use and practices in usage which effect our dealings
with images are also taking shape in hypertextual cyberspace. In the
World Wide Web, however, images often still function according to the
traditional pattern as a kind of quasi-reference. They interrupt the flow
of links and represent artificial end points of menus, i.e. impasses in
hyperspace. These referential modes of usage of images is what Bolter
has in mind when he writes: “The naive belief in the directness of the
image has a long history, the traces of which can be followed from the
discovery of perspective painting through to the present day. Today too
even the most refined observer of the World Wide Web can be tempted
to forget the complex character of a Web page, so as to concentrate on
the static or moving image as a direct representation of reality” (Bolter,
1997, p. 54f). Following Bolter one would have to talk more or less
pejoratively of a picturalization of writing in the sense that the rele-
vance of language and writing is being visibly undermined by the
dominance of images.
But Bolter does not leave things with this negative scenario. He al-
ludes, in addition, to the possibility of a picturalization of writing which
leaves neither of the two sign systems unaltered. Thus at the end of the
essay already quoted Bolter emphasizes: “The illusion of presence will
exist in the Internet alongside more imaginative and intelligent forms of
hypertextual communication in which word and image interact with
one another in a self-referential manner.” (Bolter, 1997, p. 55) This kind
of transmedial interaction, through which both referents undergo an in-
ner transformation, becomes visible when one thinks of the picturaliza-
tion of writing along with the tendency toward scriptualization of the
image which is bound up in this.
Just as the images which play a dramaturgical role on stage in a the-
atre production are not viewed by the audience as images in isolation,
but as images which depict images, pictorial signs on the digital scene
of the Internet are able to function as references which are bound into
the concrete action-space of the pragmatic Net-use event. I call this
pragmatic decoupling of the image from its representational function
the scriptualization of the image. When we read textual signs we do not
read each letter and each word as something which stands in some kind
of similarity relation to something outside of language. Instead, when
reading, we allow ourselves to be referred from one letter to the next,
from one word to the next, from one sentence to the next, an so on. Such
98
a floating form of reading is also establishing itself in the World Wide
Web in dealings with pictorial signs. We read the image as a sign which
refers to other signs not only semantically, but also and above all prag-
matically, i.e. with a straightforward mouse-click.
If you consider not only the external scriptualization of the image but
also the internal data structure of digital images, then it becomes clear
that the images composed of pixels have textual character as a result of
their technological structure. With the corresponding editor programs,
the elements comprising a digital image can be exchanged, moved and
altered just as written characters can. In this way images become flex-
ibly editable scripts. In the digital mode the image loses its distinguis-
hed status as a representation of reality. It proves itself to be an aesthet-
ic construction, a technological work of art whose semiotics result
internally from the relations of pixels and externally through the hyper-
textual references to other documents (Mitchell, 1992).
It is surely meaningful and important in semiotic and media-theoret-
ical analyses to consider also the persistent force of well-established
meanings of terms like ‘image’, ‘language’ and ‘writing’. But in order
to understand suitably the ongoing transition from the old modes of
usage to new ones, it is necessary, in addition, to mark out terminolog-
ical shifts which might in future determine the ‘actual’ meanings of the
terms in question. This can be achieved by trying to trace on a semantic
level the changes taking place on the usage level through a methodo-
logical metaphorization of our dealings with the expressions ‘image’,
‘language’ and ‘writing’. By this I mean an anticipatory procedure
which will enable us to describe predictively the changes in meaning
and perception which are taking shape. Media-pragmatic and media-
political fields of application simultaneously open up for such a future-
oriented analysis, one opposing the traditional understanding of theory
which stipulates that academic inquiry be an archeological reconstruc-
tion of things past. The Internet’s current development to being a mass
medium, which is beginning to shape the communications behaviour
and information practices of modern society beyond the realm of the
academic elite (Morris/Ogan, 1996), marks out the largely open space
of a micropolitics of the sign: a semio-political space in which it will be
decided which dimensions of the new mass medium Internet are made
accessible to people and which will not. The concept of transversality
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can serve as a philosophical guideline for such micropolitics of the sign
(Sandbothe, 1998).
3. Transversality
The philosophical concept of transversality has long been familiar with-
in mathematics and geology (Welsch, 1995a, p. 367-371). It was first
used in a philosophical context by Jean-Paul Sartre and was first coined
as a philosophical term by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The appli-
cation to the theory of reason and the systematic extension into an edi-
fice of thought was performed by Wolfgang Welsch in two steps. A first
draft of the concept of “transversal reason” was set out by Welsch in
Chapter 11 of his Unsere postmoderne Moderne (Welsch, 1987). The
systematic elaboration followed in Vernunft. Die zeitgenössische Ver-
nunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft (Welsch, 1995a;
cf. 1998 a/b). What are the basic ideas of Welsch’s theory of transversal
reason, and how can they be related to the media transformations of our
understanding of reality described in the first two parts of the current
essay?
To answer this question I shall concentrate on the systematic account
developed by Welsch in the second part of his book on reason under the
title Transversal Reason. I shall not consider here the question of the
relation between this account and Welsch’s outline in his book on the
postmodern (cf. Welsch/Sandbothe, 1997). To begin with it should be
highlighted that Welsch develops the concept of transversal reason
without consideration of media philosophical issues. My interpretation
strategy results from this fact. It follows the pattern used by George P.
Landow to interpret Derrida in his book Hypertext. The Convergence of
Contemporary Critical Theory and Technology, and which he described
as follows: “[...] something that Derrida and other critical theorists de-
scribe as part of a seemingly extravagant claim about language turns
out to describe the new economy of reading and writing with electronic
virtual, rather than physical forms” (Landow, 1992, p. 8). From early on
Welsch had - unlike Derrida - emphasized the “exoteric” character of
postmodern thinking (Welsch, 1987, p. 202-206). What links him, how-
ever, with Derrida in terms of electronic writing is the fact that Welsch
too has not explicitly thematicized the connection between the consti-
tution of reason he describes and the media conditions which make this
reason possible and come to light in digital networks. Welsch presented
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a first analysis of the Internet in his essay Information Superhighway or
Highway Number One (Welsch, 1995b). He does not, however, estab-
lish here a direct relationship to the concept of transversal reason.
The central ideas of Welsch’s concept of transversal reason can be
summarized with three basic theses. Firstly, the constitution of rational-
ity is characterized by an ineluctable disorderliness. Secondly, reason is
in principle capable of reconstructing and describing precisely this
disorderliness. Thirdly, it is only when reason productively analyses the
subconscious entanglements of rationalities that it will be suitably
equipped to solve contemporary problems. The first thesis is directed
against the idea, dominant from Kant through to Habermas and Lyo-
tard, that reason is concerned with an orderly framework of rationality
types clearly divided from one another. The second thesis opposes the
danger of diffusion which has led, especially in the setting of posthi-
storical thinking, but also with some postmodern philosophers, to a
position of arbitrariness and of ‘anything goes’. The third thesis makes
it clear that applied and problem-oriented philosophy must in no way
amount to a simple application of abstract philosophical models to real-
ity. In its pragmatic and transversal version it is capable of reflexion
about those constellations of rationalities which are effective practical-
ly and which are already determined in their inner by contingent reali-
ties.
All three theses can be illustrated with the aid of the interactive
hypertextuality of the World Wide Web. In doing this I take as my guide
the assumption that the World Wide Web is a medium in which the - for
the book culture, subconscious and hidden - disorderliness of rational-
ity which Welsch dealt with comes explicitly to light. First of all, how-
ever, it is important to append a distinction which is central to the
understanding of Welsch’s basic theses. It is explained by Welsch in the
Introduction to the second part of his book. I mean the distinction be-
tween rationality and reason. In recourse to the Kantian distinction be-
tween understanding and reason Welsch defines reason as that faculty
whose task it is to reflect upon the relationship between different types
of rationality (Welsch, 1995a, 437f).
The first of the three basic theses relates to the relationship between
rationalities. To begin with it leaves aside the issue of reason in the
sense of a faculty of reflexion which goes beyond these.  The relation-
ship between rationalities is defined by Welsch as “rational disorderli-
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ness” (Welsch, 1995a, p. 447). Whereas, from Kant through to Haber-
mas and Lyotard, the framework of rationalities has been conceived of
in a way guided by the book, namely as a relational framework of sepa-
rate, in themselves autonomous chapters (Kant, Habermas) or apho-
risms (Lyotard), Welsch, in recourse to Derrida and Deleuze, compares
“the real consitution of rationalities” (Welsch, 1995a, p. 448) with
“moving and changing, net and web-like architectures” (Welsch,
1995a, p. 943). Welsch shows in detail that the classically ordered
framework of cognitive, aesthetic and moral-practical rationalities is a
superficial phenomenon. A contingent network of “family resem-
blances” (Welsch, 1995a, p. 534ff) between different paradigms and
alliances of paradigms form the fundament for this. The maxim for
rationality theory resulting from this is to uncover “the whole traffic
system of both the horizontal and the vertical connections” (Welsch,
1995a, p. 601). It will thus be demonstrated, Welsch continues, “that the
[...] interparadigmatic [...] entanglements are mostly not hierarchically,
but laterally organized. The connection has more the structure of a
network than of stratification” (Welsch, 1995a, p. 601).
Against this background the World Wide Web can be interpreted as
an eminent medium of transversal reason. The entanglements and tran-
sitions analysed in detail by Welsch become media reality in the World
Wide Web as electronic links. Welsch’s reinterpretation of the classical
triad of rationalities as an “effect of family resemblances” (Welsch,
1995a, p. 534) can be illustrated directly with the World Wide Web. In
the World Wide Web the classical distinction between the varying types
of rationality plays an important role. Thus three different highways can
be differentiated on the theoretical level: the (cognitively accented)
Information and Commerce Highway, the Education Highway (serving
moral-practical aims), and the  (aesthetically founded) Entertainment
Highway. However, in our practical dealings with the Net - unlike out-
side the Net - we are aware at all times that these distinctions are intro-
duced by us into a complex framework of hyperlinks whose internal
family resemblances constantly shift, and produce different configura-
tions according to different perspectives. Whereas the medium of the
book and thinking schooled thereby conceals rather than clarifies these
relations, the World Wide Web makes them explicit.
The second basic thesis of Welsch’s theory can also be fruitfully
deployed for the philosophical analysis of the World Wide Web. Unlike
102
the first, this thesis does not relate solely to the mesh of rationalities, but
focuses on the faculty of reflecting reason which operates within this
mesh. It is this faculty’s task to correct “the insufficient self-compre-
hension and the excessive self-confidence of paradigms” (Welsch,
1995a, p. 673) from which the net of rationality types is composed.
Paradigms tend to ignore their position within a net of nets and the rela-
tivity resulting from this. They are transfixed by their objects and self-
forgetfully obscure the stuctural conditions of their abilities. If they do
perceive of their own surroundings, the conditions of their own possi-
bility, and their competitors, then it is mostly in the mode of denial or
reprimand. They declare themselves to be the sole true and valid para-
digm, make false claims to exclusivity, and tend to an implied absolut-
ism. It is the task of transversal reason to inform the rationalities arising
from paradigms of this twofold self-misunderstanding: “Where this
twofold explanation is successful, reason’s interventions transform the
singular paradigms from their merely rational to their reasonable form”
(Welsch, 1995a, p. 673). 
The World Wide Web confronts us with similar problems. This is
already demonstrated by the resistance with which the establishment of
a consistently hypertextual practice meets. Every text, every picture,
every Web page tends to proclaim itself the centre of the Net. The prob-
lem recurs on the technical level: every Web browser, every provider of
access to the Net implicitly or explicitly claims to be offering the only
true and authentic access to the medium. Even taking a glance at the
definition of the whole, the battle over the ‘true’ World Wide Web dom-
inates. There are firstly those proclaiming this to be the Commerce Net,
secondly those in favour of the Education Net, and still others in favour
of the Entertainment Highway. Each party of course considers itself the
exclusive and sole binding govenor of the Net.
But it is not only the initial problems of radical plurality to which
transversal reason reacts, rather the operation of this reason itself can be
illustrated with the help of the World Wide Web. On the level of texts,
pictures and Web pages, search robots, bookmarks and hotlists function
as instantiations of transversal reason in software. Just as transversal
reason, these are characterized by “purity, emptiness and superiority”
(Welsch, 1995a, 631ff). The Net tools named are independent of con-
tent, purely formal structures for the generation of relations. They sup-
ply the user with the means required to break through the excessive
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self-estimation of the subsystems and to cast light on the Net’s hyper-
landscape, i.e. the intertwined connections between Web pages. In the
course of the Internet’s commercialization, however, efforts are in-
creasing to functionalize search engines for economic purposes. The
efforts are made easier by the fact that those offering search engines
keep the exact search algorithm secret. Friedrich Kittler has rightly
drawn attention to the fact that a central future task for universities will
consist of “storing knowledge in a firm-independent manner” (Kittler,
1998, p. 144).
On the level of browser programs, the free availability of shareware
versions of various Net browsers and on-line discussion of their advan-
tages and disadvantages contribute to preventing the establishment of a
browser-monopoly. Traits of transversal reason can be recognized in
this too. The same applies on the level of providers of Internet access:
Transversal gateways, through which the various providers are linked
to the World Wide Web and to each other, relativize the view of the Net
given by a particular provider. It should be emphasized in this that, on
all three levels (Web pages, browsers, providers), it is not a matter of
just a media realization of a theoretical faculty, but rather of practical
demands and concrete tasks which mark the way for future media poli-
cies. The necessity of such corrective media policies becomes particu-
larly clear in the face of massive commercialization and monopoliza-
tion tendencies, such as those being aggressively pushed in the field of
browsers by Microsoft and in the providers’ field by America Online
against the traditional Net culture of plurality.
Thus I come to the third basic thesis of Welsch’s book on reason.
Philosophy which operates guided by transversal reason is already
practice in its core. Transversal reason has no need for a belated appli-
cation to concrete problems, but is already eminently political in itself.
This last aspect of transversal reason also comes into its own in the
World Wide Web. Writing and thinking in the Net are of themselves al-
ready practical operations. This means, first of all, at a completely fun-
damental level that they are artisan in character. Writing and thinking in
the Net cannot be separated from the creative installation of hyperlinks,
from the aesthetic design of Web pages, from the formative work with
graphical editor programs and skilled HTML encodement. These are all
practical, i.e. artistic-artisanal, operations through which the writer is
torn out of the position of the pure observer and bound within concrete
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interactional contexts. Something similar can be said of the way we
deal with Net tools. Work with these tools, but also the hypertextual
structure itself, leads to the user being referred from the supposedly
pure theoretical investigation for which he strives to institutional entan-
glements, to seemingly remote connections and political contexts. The
tools refer you to institutional intertwinements, apparently stray con-
nections, as well as political relationships and at the same time provide
a range of instruments allowing users to network themselves in an intel-
ligent and effective manner into virtual and real communities which are
addressing these connections and relationships (Lévy, 1997).
Following a relatively long phase of reserve and ignorance toward
the media political tasks resulting from the establishment of the Internet
as a mass medium, an awareness of the far-reaching politico-practical
implications of transmedia network technologies is increasingly pre-
vailing in Europe too. The current state of Internet technology is the
result of transdisciplinary scientific Net-use practice, which established
itself, having starting at the American elite universities such as Stan-
ford, Harvard or MIT, worldwide in the seventies and eighties. At the
centre of this practice are  the Enlightenment ideals of openness, trans-
parency, free exchange of information and experimental curiosity.
Upholding this tradition, even or precisely in the conditions of an in-
creasingly accentuated commercialization of the Internet, transpires as
a central concern for responsible Internet politics. Transversal reason
could serve as a philosophical guideline for a pragmatic micropolitics
of the sign in that it contributes to helping us see the specific constitu-
tion of transmedia technologies and making clear the chances linked
with sensible usage of these technologies.
The results of my considerations can be summarized in three points.
Firstly, the World Wide Web proves itself to be a genuine medium of
transversal reason. Secondly, the concept of transversal reason estab-
lishes itself as a basis for a pragmatic media philosophy. Thirdly, the
task for this is to demonstrate in detail the relationship between media
in the broad, narrow and narrowest sense as a relationship of transver-
sal entanglements. On this basis the media transformations in our
understanding of reality which are taking place in the age of digital net-
work technology can be philosophically analysed and pragmatically
implemented without speculative bombast.
Translated from German by Andrew Inkpin
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